in residual wage inequality, especially in the March CPS.
A second important difference is that, unlike in most other studies, I control for composition effects.2 Wage dispersion among narrowly defined groups of workers is substantially larger for older and more educated workers than for younger and less educated works. As result, I show that a large fraction of the increase in residual wage inequality is a spurious consequence of the fact that the work force has grown older and more educated since the early 1980s. A final difference with earlier studies is that much more data are now available for studying secular changes in residual wage inequality. For example, I use wage data for up to 2003, while the last year of wage data available to JMP was 1989. Composition effects play a much bigger role in changes in residual inequality in the 1990s and early 2000s than in the 1970s and 1980s. This may explain why composition effects remained relatively unnoticed in the earlier literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, I discuss in more detail the link between residual wage inequality, unobserved skill prices, and composition effects. I explain how to account for composition effects in Section II. Section III presents the May/ORG CPS data and shows basic trends in within-group wage inequality for 20 experience-education groups. The main results on the evolution of residual wage inequality once composition effects are adjusted for are presented in Section IV. Section V shows why both the level of and growth in residual wage inequality are overstated in the March CPS. Section VI concludes by suggesting possible explanations for the trends in residual wage inequality since the early 1970s. What I call "residual wage inequality" is simply the measured inequality in the residual, it,. The main inequality measure used in the paper is the variance because, unlike other popular measures like the difference between the ninetieth and the tenth percentile of log wages (the "90-10 gap"), it is a decomposable measure of inequality.3 Using equation (2), the residual variance can be written as: Katz and Autor, 1999) , the assumption that the residual variance and skill prices are the two sides of the same coin means that skill prices have been steadily rising over the last 30 years. While this is generally interpreted as support for SBTC, the difference in the timing of changes in residual wage inequality and other wage differentials such as the college-high school wage premium was initially viewed as a puzzle in the literature (Frank Levy and Richard J. Murnane, 1992; Jacob Mincer, 1997) . After all, if these various dimensions of wage dispersion were all linked to similar factors like technological change, they should more or less vary in a similar way over time.
JMP attempt to reconcile this initial puzzle 3The total variance of wages can be written as Var (wi,) = Var(xib,) + Var(e,) and the residual variance is the fraction (1 -R2) of the overall variance of wages. By contrast, the 90-10 gap in wi, is not generally equal to the sum of the 90-10 gap in xib, and in ei,. As a result, arbitrary choices have to be made when trying to quantify the contribution of residual inequality to overall inequality, which complicates the economic interpretation of the results. 4 The procedure described here is based on how JMP explain in words how their procedure works. The equations in their paper describe the conditional distribution of the residuals for given values of the regressors, suggesting that the procedure could, in principle, control for composition effects. See Lemieux (2002) for more discussion of this issue. using a two-factor model for observed (education and experience) and unobserved skills. Like Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) , JMP view the increase in the relative demand for skills as the driving force behind the expansion of the college-high school wage premium during the 1980s. They argue that during the 1970s, however, the growth in the relative demand for skill was offset by an even stronger growth in the relative supply of college-educated labor. By contrast, residual wage inequality grew in the 1970s because the relative supply of unobserved skills did not increase during this period (or other periods). The role of growing relative demand in residual wage inequality was not "masked" by a large increase in supply in the 1970s, as in the case of the college-high school premium.
While JMP's synthesis of the causes of growing wage inequality had a major impact in labor economics and other fields, there is a growing number of problems with the story.6 First, it works for only a very specific production function, namely a CES function in education (or experience) and unobserved skills (Acemoglu, 2002) .7 By contrast, when unobserved skills (e.g., school quality or cognitive skills) are close substitutes for education, increases in the supply of education should depress both the college-high school premium and the return to unobserved skills.8 Second, both Card and DiNardo (2002) and Paul Beaudry and David A. Green (2005) point out that the pattern of change in wage inequality in the 1990s is hard to reconcile with a traditional supply-and-demand explanation. In particular, the college-high school premium increased much less in the 1990s than in the 1980s, despite the fact that relative supply kept increasing at the same rate. The "supply" explanation for why residual wage inequality grew in the 1970s while the college-high school wage premium did not grow does not work for the 1990s.
Third, if the increase in the price of unobserved skills was the most important source of growing wage inequality, we should have seen a large increase in the return to various measures of "ability" and in the male-female, or blackwhite, wage gap (to the extent that part of these gaps is due to differences in unobserved skills). The fact that none of those wage differentials expanded over the last three decades is a major challenge to the view that the return to unobserved skills grew substantially during this period.9 Figure 1 illustrates how the results of the paper suggest a surprising "explanation" for these various puzzles in the inequality literature. The explanation is that there was simply not a puzzle in the first place because the return to unobserved skills (a) increased only in the 1980s; and (b) does not account for much of the overall increase in wage inequality over the last three decades. These points are illustrated in Figure 1 , which plots the between-group variance and the composition-adjusted residual variance (based on 1973 characteristics) for men using the May/ORG CPS data for 1973 to 2003. I explain in detail later how these two series are computed. The important point is that, unlike the unadjusted residual variance computed from the March CPS, the compositionadjusted residual variance reported in Figure 1 can be interpreted as reflecting underlying changes in unobserved skill prices.
The figure clearly shows that unobserved skills prices increased only in the 1980s, just like education and experience differentials, 6 Beyond labor economics, JMP's interpretation of growing residual inequality as an increase in the skill premium has laid the foundations for a large and influential literature on economic growth, technical change, and inequality (see Acemoglu, 2002 , and Philippe Aghion, 2002, for recent surveys of this literature).
7 Acemoglu (2002) illustrates this point using a "two-bytwo" factor model. The first factor is education (college and high school) and the second factor is unobserved skills (low and high). The CES assumption implies that the substitutability between college workers with low and high (unobserved) skills is the same as the substitutability between high-skill college workers and low-skill high-school workers, which is not a very appealing property of the production function.
8 Years of schooling and school quality are perfect substitutes in an "efficiency units" model of schooling where schooling (in efficiency units) is the product of years of schooling and school quality. In this model, residual inequality and the college-high-school premium should move exactly together over time. Even if the puzzles listed above are no longer so puzzling after all, the obvious question that emerges from Figure 1 is why so much of the growth in inequality is concentrated in the 1980s. I return to this question in Section VI.
II. Accounting for Composition Effects
Leaving aside measurement error, equation (3) shows that the residual variance depends both on the price of unobserved skills, p, and on the variance of unobserved skills, Var(ei,). In this section, I argue that there are strong empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that the variance of unobserved skills has increased over the last 30 years because of composition effects. I then propose a simple method for controlling for these effects. In the absence of measurement error (I return to this issue in Section V), the residual variance of wages, Var(ei,), is then obtained by substituting equations (6) and (4) into equation (3):
Var(si,) = pt C Ojtao.
In this model, an increase in the residual variance can now be interpreted as an increase in skill prices, pt, when the skill composition of the work force (the Ojt's) is held constant. Equation (7) suggests a straightforward way of holding the skill composition of the work force constant. The residual variance just has to be recomputed at some counterfactual values of the shares, 0", which remain constant over time. To see this, rewrite the residual variance as a function of Vj,, the variance of wages within each skill group j Assuming that changing the skill composition of the work forces has no general equilibrium effects on skill prices, the counterfactual residual variance, V*t is13 Lee (2000) . The problem is that younger cohorts of workers may have different distributions of unobserved skills because, for example, of intercohort changes in the distribution of school quality. JMP convincingly argue that the steep growth in residual inequality in the late 1970s and early 1980s cannot be due to cohort effects, because inequality growth accelerated uniformly for all cohorts. Unfortunately, this argument cannot be used to rule out smooth long-run trends in inequality linked to changing cohort composition, because of the well-known problem that linear cohort, age, and time effects cannot be separately identified.
12 More generally, the assumption means that F,(eij,i) F(eilxi,) for all time periods t. 13 Increasing the share of more educated and experienced workers depresses the return to these observed skills in a standard supply-and-demand model. The effect on unobserved skill prices depends, however, on the substitutability between observed and unobserved skills (see Section I).
When the number of skill groups is small relative to sample sizes, the within-group variance Vjt can be computed for each skill group j. It is then straightforward to estimate the counterfactual variance by replacing the year-specific shares, Ojt,, by some average or base year shares, 0714 In Section III, I present some basic trends in residual and within-group inequality by dividing data in a limited number of experienceeducation cells ( (counterfactual) distribution of skills at time t the same as in an appropriate base year (for example, 1973). These weights are obtained by multiplying the sample weights wi, by a reweighting factor. Intuitively, to transform the skill distribution of 2003 back to its 1973 level, we need to put less weight on more educated and experienced workers, since the share of these workers has increased over time. In practice, the reweighting factor is computed using the estimates from a logit model for the probability of being in year t relative to the base year. 17 One well-known problem with using schooling as a regressor in wage equations is that schooling is not measured in a consistent fashion over time in the CPS. Prior to 1992, the CPS asked about the highest grade attended, and whether the highest grade was completed. Starting in 1992, however, the CPS switched to a question about the highest grade or diploma completed. It is, nonetheless, possible to construct a relatively consistent variable for years of schooling completed over the whole sample period. The nine categories I use for years of schooling completed are 0-4, 5-8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13-15, 16, and 17+.
18 While it would be ideal to use an unrestricted set of age-education dummies in the wage regressions, in practice many age-education cells are quite small in the March and May supplements of the CPS. The flexible specification I use fits the data quite well. In the larger ORG samples, using a full set of age-education dummies raises the R-square only by about half a percentage point relative to the specification used in the paper. Note also that variables like race, marital status, and other socioeconomic variables are often used in standard wage regressions. I use only years of schooling and years of age (or potential experience) as regressors to focus on arguably "pure" measures of skills. The results for women in Table 1B are shows the change in the shares over time. For both men and women, there is a large and systematic decline in the share of workers in groups with low within-group wage dispersion. This is most obvious when looking at education. For women, column 6 of Table IB shows that, for all experience groups, the share of women with a high-school degree or less has declined over time. By contrast, the share of women with some college education or more has increased for each and every experience group. With two small exceptions, the same pattern holds for men in Table lA . The other clear pattern is that the share of more experienced workers relative to young workers systematically increases for all education groups (except high-school drop- The results for women reported in Table  IB Figure 2 provides some information on the detailed year-by-year evolution of the withingroup variance for each of the five education groups. To control for changes in the experience distribution of the work force, the variance for each education group is defined as the simple average of the within-group variances over the four experience groups. For example, the within-group variance for college graduates in Figure 2 is the arithmetic average of the withingroup variances for college graduates with 1-10, 11-20, 21-30, and 31 or more years of experience.
I show only the detailed evolution in the within-group variance by education groups for two reasons. First, it would not be practical to show the detailed evolution in the within-group variance for each of the 20 experience-education groups. Second, Table 1 suggests that, conditional on education, the change in the withingroup variance is relatively similar across experience groups. In other words, education (as opposed to experience) accounts for most of the variation in the growth in the within-group variance across the 20 experience-education groups.
The trends in within-group wage inequality for men (Figure 2A ) and women ( Figure 2B ) are different in different decades. For both men and women, the within-group variances are either stable or declining during the 1970s. The within-group variances then grow substantially for each and every group during the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, there is a divergence in the trends by education groups. For college graduates and postgraduates, the within-group variance increases slightly or remains constant between 1990 and 2000. For all other education groups, however, the within-group variance declines during the 1990s. The decline is particularly pronounced for high-school dropouts. Finally, the within-group variances grow mildly for most groups during the early 2000s.
Taken together, the results in Table 1 became younger (lower within-group variance) during this period. By contrast, Appendix Table 1 
V. What Is Wrong with the March CPS?
As mentioned in the introduction, the findings of Section III and IV are at odds with most of the previous literature on residual wage inequality. In addition to composition effects, one potential explanation for this difference is that I use data on hourly wages from the May and ORG supplements of the CPS, while earlier studies typically use the March supplement of the CPS.
In this section, I argue that a key problem with the March CPS is that it poorly measures In particular, around 60 percent of workers in the May/ORG CPS are paid by the hour (see Figure 8 on page 484). These workers report a direct measure of their hourly wage rate in the May/ORG CPS. In the March CPS, however, they have to report their total annual earnings and hours of work, which are then used to compute an average hourly wage rate.
In the absence of measurement error, it should not matter whether hourly wages are computed directly from questions about hourly wage rates, or indirectly by dividing earnings by hours of work. Several validation studies show, however, that there is substantial measurement error in the earnings reported in the CPS or similar surveys.21
It is plausible to think that asking directly hourly-rated workers about their hourly wage rates provides a more accurate wage measure than dividing earnings by hours. If it is easier for workers paid by the hour to report directly their hourly wage rate, this measure will likely be less affected by error than the indirect wage measure based on average hourly earnings. For example, a minimum-wage worker will likely know and correctly report the exact value of the hourly wage at which he or she is paid. The same worker would probably have more difficulty reporting total hours and earnings during the year. In fact, the U.S. Census Bureau and other national statistical offices often mention the case of the minimum wage as one reason for asking directly workers paid by the hour about their hourly wage rate.
My basic hypothesis is that for hourly-rated workers, the hourly wage rate indirectly computed from the March CPS is a noisier measure of the true hourly rate of pay than the hourly wage rate collected in the May/ORG CPS. For workers not paid by the hour, the hourly wage rate has to be indirectly computed by dividing earnings by hours in both the May/ORG and the March CPS. Therefore, I do not expect the hourly wage from the March CPS to be a noisier measure for these workers.
Under the additional assumption of classical measurement error, this hypothesis yields several clear empirical predictions.22 The most direct prediction is that the variance of March CPS wages should be larger than the variance of May/ORG CPS wages among workers paid by the hour. I test this prediction by comparing the variance of the two wage measures for workers paid by the hour and workers not paid by the hour.
One problem with implementing this test is that the March CPS does not ask individuals whether they are paid by the hour or not. Despite these large differences in levels, the pattern of change in the variances over time is relatively similar in the March and May/ORG CPS. For both wage measures, the variance of wages for hourly workers is flat in the 1970s, grows sharply in the 1980s, and remains relatively constant thereafter. For workers not paid by the hour, however, the variance of wages keeps increasing steadily during the 1990s. This is consistent with workers not paid by the hour being much more educated than workers paid by the hour (see below), and within-group inequality increasing for college educated workers in the 1990s.
There Appendix Figure 3A shows the estimated measurement error variances for men paid by the hour and not paid by the hour. Appendix Figure 3B reports the same estimates for women. As expected from Figure 5 , the measurement error variances for nonhourly workers are comparable in the March and May/ORG CPS. Table 3 shows that measurement error accounts for about 20 percent of the variance of wages for these workers. Also, as expected, the measurement error variance for hourly workers is much larger in the March than in the May/ ORG CPS. Measurement error represents about a third of total variance of wages in the March CPS compared to only about 10 percent of the total variance of wages in the May/ORG CPS. Interestingly, the measurement error variance for nonhourly workers lies more or less in between the measurement error variance for hourly workers in the May/ORG and March CPS. This is inconsistent with the suggestion of Autor et al. (2005) that the variance of measurement error is the same for hourly and nonhourly workers in the March CPS.
The estimates suggest that the growth in the fraction of workers paid by the hour both biases upward the growth in inequality in the March CPS, and biases downward the growth in inequality in the May/ORG CPS. The magnitude of these biases is shown in row 3A of Table  3 under the assumption that the fraction of hourly workers increased by 10 percent for men and 15 percent for women (see Figure 8) .
Interestingly, Appendix Figure 3 and Table  3 (rows 2A and 2B) also indicate that the measurement error variance generally has been growing over time. This suggests that part of the increase in residual wage inequality is simply a consequence of the fact that wages are increasingly badly measured in both the March and the May/ORG CPS. Row 3B of Table 3 shows that, for men, the variance of measurement error increased by 0.018 in the March CPS compared to 0.004 in the May/ORG CPS. For women, the corresponding measurement error variances grew by 0.014 (March CPS) and 0.013 (May/ ORG CPS). Since the two sources of measurement error go in opposite directions for men in the May/ORG CPS, the adjusted change in the residual variance (row 5) is the same as the change unadjusted for measurement error (row 4). By contrast, the adjusted change is systematically smaller than the unadjusted change in the March CPS, as both sources of measurement error tend to inflate the growth in the residual variance.
I conclude from this detailed examination of the measurement of hourly wages in the CPS that the May/ORG CPS provides a more accurate measure of both the level and the growth in residual wage inequality than the March CPS. For men, the growth in residual wage inequality is unaffected by measurement error corrections in the May/ORG CPS. For women, adjusting for measurement error reduces the growth in residual inequality in May/ORG CPS from 0.057 to 0.047. Measurement error adjustments are even larger in the March CPS, suggesting that the growth in residual wage inequality as measured in this dataset is substantially biased upward.
VI. Concluding Comments: What Explains the (Modest) Growth in Residual Wage Inequality?
The "common wisdom" about residual wage inequality is that it grows steadily over time and accounts for most of the overall growth in wage inequality. A very different picture emerges when the composition of the work force is held constant over time and wages are measured using the "better" May/ORG CPS instead of the March CPS. In particular, I find that residual wage inequality accounts for only a modest share of the growth in overall inequality between 1973 and 2003 after these adjustments are made. I also find that residual wage inequality generally moves in tandem with other "between-group" wage differentials. From a time-series point of view, the growth in both residual and between-group wage inequality is all concentrated in the 1980s (Figure 6 and 7) . From a cross-sectional point of view, the group of workers for which residual inequality grows the most (college-educated workers) also happens to be a group for which relative wages expanded the most dramatically over the last 30 years.30
As discussed in Section I, these findings have important implications for the interpretation of the role of unobserved skill prices in the overall growth in wage inequality. First, they help resolve several puzzles linked to the timing and extent of changes in observable and unobservable skill prices. Second, the results generally reinforces the conclusion of Card and DiNardo (2002) that the timing of the growth in wage inequality is difficult to reconcile with the SBTC hypothesis. This paper poses a further challenge to the SBTC hypothesis, since I find that residual inequality actually declined in periods other than the 1980s. Technological change can explain these changes only under the implausible assumption that while technological change was biased in favor of skilled workers during the 1980s, it was biased in favor of unskilled workers during the other periods. This suggests looking at other possible explanations for changes in residual wage inequality. For example, DiNardo et al. (1996) find that the decline in the real value of the minimum wage during the 1980s accounts for about a third of the increase in residual wage inequality. Lee (1999) finds an even larger effect by allowing for spillover effects of the minimum wage. Interestingly, the basic trends in the real value of the minimum wage are closely related to the trends in residual wage inequality documented above. For example, row C of Table 2 shows that the real value of the minimum wage declined in the 1980s and early 2000s, while residual inequality increased during those two periods. By contrast, residual inequality declined when the real value of the minimum wage increased during the 1970s and 1990s. men and women, respectively. This is a very good fit since there is almost no time trend in the residual variance (the dependent variable). For both men ( Figure 9A ) and women (Figure 9B) , the minimum wage has a strong impact on the residual variance. The regression models are reported in the figures and show large tstatistics for the effect of the minimum wage (t-statistic of 9 for men, and 12 for women). Consistent with DiNardo et al. (1996) , the effect of the minimum wage is also larger for women than men. The "visual fit" of the model is most impressive for women. The large increases in the minimum wage in 1973-1974, 1989-1991, and 1995-1997 all closely match corresponding declines in the residual variance. By contrast, the three periods where the minimum wage declined in real terms for failing to be indexed (1981-1989, 1992-1995, and 1998-2003) A more traditional but related "human capital" explanation is that when the return to college education increases, we also expect the return to a "good" college education to increase even more. This idea can be captured in a "single index" model, where total educational input is simply the product of years of schooling and school quality. This implies that school quality and years of schooling are perfect substitutes, and that the within-group variance for college graduates (variance of school quality times the return to college) is proportional to the return to college. The important point here is that a standard human capital approach could help explain the cross-sectional pattern of changes in both residual wage inequality and between-group wage differentials observed in the data.
In summary, the fact that residual wage inequality growth is not that important quantitatively, and moves in tandem with betweengroup inequality, generally simplifies the "story" on changes in wage inequality. It leaves only two key questions to be answered. The first question is why the overall growth in wage inequality is so concentrated in the 1980s. The second question is why wage inequality has mostly expanded in the upper end of the wage distribution. I have suggested possible answers to these questions but much, nonetheless, remains to be done in future research. 33 The idea is that workers in the middle of the distribution are those who perform "skilled but routine" tasks. They are thus the most adversely affected by technological change. For reasons discussed in detail in Section V, trends in residual wage inequality appear to be substantially biased upward in the March CPS. One problem is that the wages of hourly rated workers are particularly badly measured in the March CPS, and the fraction of hourly rated workers has grown over time. The importance of composition effects can also be understated
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